Alex Fuentes On this episode, we’ll be delving into the world of raw materials policy, in particular discussing the EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act and UNFC’s integration within it.

Chris Stockey Joining us on this episode is Vitor Correia, the Secretary General of the International Raw Materials Observatory and part of the UN Expert Group on Resource Management. He is also the past President of the European Federation of Geologists. Welcome, Vitor. It’s great to have you on the show with us today.

Vitor Correia Thank you so much, Chris. It’s a pleasure to be here and thank you for the kind introduction.

Chris Stockey Yes, it’s a very impressive list of credentials. Would you be able to give us an introduction to your experience within the world of minerals policy, what INTRAW is and your role in the organization, and also your role within that UN Expert Group?

Vitor Correia Yes, of course. The International Raw Materials Observatory, or INTRAW, was created as a spinoff from a Horizon 2020 project that started in 2014. In that project, the goal was to look for best practices in five countries: Australia, Canada, Japan, the US, and South Africa. We were looking for best practices in the raw materials domain, specifically exploration, extraction, and processing. The idea was to convey messages to the European Union early on regarding benchmarks that we could use in Europe. At the end of the project, the partners decided that since we had a nice digest of ideas, we should continue.

We then created the Observatory as a not-for-profit organization based in Brussels. The main goal is to provide intelligence and information for policymaking. We are also very much engaged in scenarios and having a long-term view of minerals talks. We provide support to organizations, remain completely neutral, and position ourselves as honest brokers. We are international; aside from being based in Brussels, we have many connections and contacts with colleagues from all over. This is relevant because, as most people working in geosciences are aware, we don’t have frontiers. You don’t have divisions when you are talking about mineral deposits that only exist in specific locations. We really need this international cooperation to go forward.

Regarding my background with the United Nations Expert Group on Resource Management, that started when I was serving as President of the European Federation of Geologists. The United Nations Framework Classification (UNFC) was being developed, and they had a group of nearly 100 people supporting that effort. We have been involved since then.

Alex Fuentes What are your thoughts on the aims of the CRMA, and what parts are the most important to you?

Vitor Correia I should emphasize that the CRMA, which was approved in April 2024, is a regulation. But it didn’t start there. The European Union started looking toward raw materials in 2008 with the Raw Materials Initiative. Before that, there was an incident between Japan and China—the so-called Senkaku Incident—where a boat collision triggered China to block rare earth exports to Japan. This caused a peak in the price of rare earths, which served as an alarm to policymakers worldwide, including Europe, to start building supply chains.

With globalization, the approach was open trade. Because the best deposits are not necessarily located where you are, it made sense to import copper from South America instead of extracting it in Europe. Globalization changed things, and supply chains became more dispersed. This created challenges and inflamed blocks that prevent trade from being completely free and open.

This raises concerns, as was the case with the Senkaku incident. It led many policymakers to start looking at supply chains. 2008 was the start, and in 2011, the European Commission began making criticality assessments every three years to see how dependent we are on certain minerals. These assessments provide the list of materials we rely on. In 2024, the Critical Raw Materials Act was launched because we realized we really need access to these materials; the situation today is worse than it has ever been. We depend on a few countries for most supplies, and these materials are vital for the energy transition and European defense. If we are talking about European autonomy, we are really dependent on raw materials we don’t currently extract or process in Europe. The Act is a tool highlighting the need for access to these materials.

Chris Stockey That’s a brilliant overview. It’s so important to have that context because while we talk about the Critical Raw Materials Act on this podcast, not everyone is familiar with why it was formed. We’ve seen similar things with the Inflation Reduction Act in the United States. This week, President Ursula von der Leyen gave a speech talking about the RESourceEU plan, bolstering the CRMA’s discussion of domestic resilience in the supply chain. Do you feel that launch changes anything currently within the CRMA, or does it just bolster and shift the emphasis of the existing plan?

Vitor Correia That’s a very good question. My perception is that the announcement of the RESourceEU plan is a political move. It’s a reaction to the recent transactional move by the Trump administration and China’s blockade on rare earth exports. It shows that raw materials are on the political agenda, which is important. However, the reasons why we don’t have extraction or processing in Europe are not difficult to understand.

Going back to the 70s, we realized it might be easier to extract minerals where the deposits are better or cheaper, which legitimized the displacement of mining outside Europe. Over time, we lost the memory of mining. Most people don’t realize that the metals and goods we use every day need to be mined in most cases. This disconnect justifies the idea that mining is bad.

The second point is processing. Why don’t we process in Europe? The reason is energy costs. If you compare energy costs in Europe against China, it’s clear that with higher energy costs—and processing being very energy-intensive—it is difficult to have economically feasible operations in Europe. So we don’t have mining and we don’t have processing. Now, it’s difficult to open new mines because of strong public opposition. This is part of living in a democracy where people are free to protest. The question now is how we can establish dialogues that enable mining, especially where the deposits are.

When talking about the critical list, we are often talking about materials used in small quantities, with a few exceptions like aluminum or copper. The problem with small markets is that prices can be manipulated. For elements like germanium or gallium, the global amounts used are small and most processing comes from one country. That country can increase prices at any time, or they can lower prices to make mining projects elsewhere unfeasible. Using this dumping approach, they can control the market. So the main problems are public opposition and a lack of investors because these markets are small and prone to manipulation.

Chris Stockey That is a succinct overview of the policy and international diplomacy legacy affecting the mining value chain. It’s difficult because many people aren’t familiar with the stages from exploration to extraction and refinement. Thank you for such a comprehensive view. Alex, I know you wanted to talk about some specific aims of the CRMA.

Alex Fuentes You’ve partly answered my question about the biggest barriers to overcome, such as public opposition and investors. You also highlighted the importance of the timeline. How can these barriers be overcome, and how can these timelines be met?

Vitor Correia Regarding the timelines for Strategic Projects, the CRMA tags certain projects as “Strategic” based on their location, size, and importance. There are targets: 10% domestic extraction, 40% processing in Europe, and 15% coming from recycling. For Strategic Projects, there is a “speedway” to enable faster permitting so extraction can start as soon as possible.

But again, we live in democracies with courts. We see public opposition, particularly for “greenfield” projects located in areas without previous mining. “Brownfield” projects in existing mining areas are more likely to happen. The problem with greenfield projects isn’t just public opposition; it’s also a lack of people in permitting authorities. These are complex projects requiring a combination of environmental, economic, social, and legal dimensions across different jurisdictions. Sometimes authorities don’t have the necessary skills or personnel.

Remember, some countries in Europe haven’t had active metal mining for decades. In Portugal, one project has been waiting for a permit for almost 14 years. We are also facing a shortage of mining geologists. Universities in Europe aren’t getting students on board, whereas in China, they have thousands. I once gave a talk in Chengdu to over 1,000 geology students in one room—it looked like the size of all the geology students in Europe combined.

Chris Stockey It’s one big lecture theatre for sure! There are big challenges, but that’s the purpose of big European policy. You mentioned Strategic Projects; could you give us an overview of their purpose and an idea of how much faster this expedited timeline is than usual?

Vitor Correia It’s much faster than usual. To give you an idea, starting a new mine currently takes about ten years. This is true in both Europe and the US. For investors, stability in regulation is one of the most important things. They don’t like jurisdictions where regulations are constantly being updated or challenged. The US mining regulation was decades old, and that stability was appreciated.

Strategic Projects are assessed using the UNFC. They are meant to have a streamlined permitting process reduced to something like 18 to 20 months—essentially two years instead of ten. That might sound like it solves the problem, but if you have public opposition, people will still go to court. And if you don’t have investors, you might have a permit but no project.

I should also underline that the European Commission does not issue permits. Brussels is not a permitting authority; country and regional authorities issue them. Land use management is often handled at the municipality level. If the local land use plan doesn’t allow for a mine, we have a problem. Governments might be aligned with Brussels, but local communities often feel they are being sacrificed so that a car plant in Germany or a battery factory in Sweden can succeed. That narrative is not easy to change.

Chris Stockey The regional scalability of this challenge is significant. It’s an EU piece of legislation, but the impacts are localized. Regarding permitting, some in the European Parliament view Strategic Projects as flagship successes. Do you think the disconnect between EU legislation and local permitting could lead to derailment? Are there areas where people are collaborating successfully to overcome this?

Vitor Correia I believe the biggest risk is this disconnect. Labeling a project as “Strategic” implies that other projects are not good, which isn’t a great image for the public. The UNFC is useful because it looks at the social, environmental, and economic performance of a project and allows us to compare different types of projects—for instance, a mining project versus a hydropower dam. This helps policy planners decide which projects to prioritize based on inventory and regional impact.

We have many examples of projects providing a “seed” for development. In the south of Portugal in the early 20th century, a pyrite mine enabled a sulfuric acid plant, which then led to a fertilizer plant and a shipyard. They built a town, a hospital, schools, and railroads. A century later, the shipyard still stands and the mine is still operating. The mine was a center for development. We need to explore the knowledge that mines can be real contributors to local, regional, and national development.

Chris Stockey That’s an interesting point. A key theme in engagement work I’ve seen is that communities are often more interested in regional infrastructure development than just local impacts. When the Strategic Projects were announced while we were in Geneva, many noticed that the selection seemed to be on a case-by-case basis, perhaps missing the opportunity for regional clusters. Do you think that feedback has reached the EU?

Vitor Correia I believe it will happen in the future. Right now, we are in a race against the clock because of the geopolitical situation—the new White House administration, China sanctions, and the Russian aggression against Ukraine. We are running against the clock, and while the second call for Strategic Projects seems to use the same assessment process, policymakers will eventually need to incorporate a broader perspective. Without public support, these projects won’t fly. Even with permits, investors won’t join without that stability. We don’t have much time, but policymakers must start working more closely with local and regional administrations.

Chris Stockey It’s an exciting opportunity for a refocus on that common aim and goal, particularly during times where we are seeing quite disparate policy emerging in different nations and municipalities. You touched on public perception. I think no public perception is “wrong,” but perhaps the level of preexisting knowledge isn’t there, as it isn’t something I was ever educated about.

We’ve both been part of EU Horizon research projects—yourself with CIRAN and ourselves with VECTOR—that have assessed these environmental and social challenges. Could you give an overview of what CIRAN was and what the big findings were regarding those challenges and societal perception?

Vitor Correia Certainly. But before I do, I want to mention something about public perception that is really important. Most people do not realize that the goods we use every day come from a mine, but there is also a bias regarding the value of those goods.

I have a spoon here on my desk. If you look at a common tool like a fork, knife, or spoon, you realize it is made of metal—usually steel with some nickel. Most people don’t realize that the price we pay for this at a store, perhaps €0.60 or €0.70, is not a fair price. To produce this, huge amounts of energy were consumed. Somewhere in the world, a cubic meter of earth was moved and huge amounts of water were used. We are so efficient at producing these goods that we provide them at very low prices, and people don’t realize the massive amount of work and materials invested. Their cost should be much higher.

There is an interesting project called the “Toaster Project”—there is a TED Talk about it—where a design student tried to build a toaster from scratch. It makes people realize that what we are paying is far from fair, and that creates a bias.

Regarding CIRAN, the project was about mining in environmentally protected areas. In Europe, 85% of critical raw material deposits are located within, or less than five kilometers from, an environmentally protected area. This obviously risks creating even greater public opposition. However, we realized that there are already many mines in Europe operating inside natural parks or protected areas. Interestingly, these mines often don’t face public opposition; they have local support and perform very well with almost no environmental footprint.

When we spoke to communities without active mining, we asked under what conditions they would be open to a new mine in a protected area. We found three conditions:

1. Criticality: The material being extracted needs to be critical. It doesn’t make sense to destroy an environmental park for a gold mine, where we just extract gold from one hole in the ground to put it in a vault in a bank. It must be for the energy transition or the public good.
2. Invisibility: There must be minimal environmental impact. The technology exists to make mines “invisible”—underground operations with best-available waste management and no surface footprint.
3. Fair Share: Local communities must receive a fair share of the benefits. We need to draw a line between local expectations and the common European good of autonomy. We came up with a tool called a “Community Development Agreement” to settle what the project can provide to the local community.

Alex Fuentes UNFC has the environmental-socio-economic (E) axis as a core element. Do you think the inclusion of this category can help the mineral sector better engage with the environment and with people?

Vitor Correia I’m going to be blunt: I believe it won’t work for that purpose. UNFC is a useful tool for experts—for you, me, and Chris—but if you approach laypeople and say a project is “Strategic” because of a UNFC classification, it’s not sufficient. The reputation of some minerals is so bad that people stop listening.

Lithium is a great case in Portugal. A colleague of mine was doing copper exploration and asked a landowner for permission to do a geophysical assessment. The landowner asked, “Is it for lithium?” My colleague said, “No, it’s for copper.” Now, copper is actually more challenging environmentally because of sulfide deposits and acid water, whereas a lithium silicate mine is more like a quarry. But the landowner replied, “Oh, copper is fine! If it was for lithium, I wouldn’t allow you.”

The reputation is so bad, and there are many false narratives. If you use technical jargon or new brand names like UNFC and tell communities you’ve measured the social dimensions, they will say, “I don’t care about that. I care about the water level in my well, the dust, the noise, and the apples on my trees.” We need to work with local communities and regional authorities to show how a project can be a “seed” for regional development.

Chris Stockey That’s an important point about transparency. If you flashed a technical CRIRSCO report at a local stakeholder, they wouldn’t find it helpful either. However, there is a commentary that UNFC was included in the CRMA so policymakers could have more transparent discussions about supply chains. Do you see a benefit there—moving away from hyper-technical reports toward something policymakers can actually use?

Vitor Correia Yes, definitely. Before the CRMA, there was a sort of competition between reporting systems like CRIRSCO, JORC, and NI 43-101. Those were designed for investors and stock markets to prove a deposit exists so that pension funds and institutional investors aren’t taking undue risks.

When UNFC was considered for the CRMA, some experts saw it as a duplication. But we’ve concluded that these are complementary tools. At the project level, CRIRSCO codes provide a granularity that UNFC cannot. However, at the country level, UNFC is a superior tool for inventory management. For a European policymaker wanting to know exactly what lithium deposits we have, UNFC is best because it includes projects that might not be economically feasible today. Under investor-focused codes, those non-feasible deposits don’t even “exist,” but for a long-term policy view, they are essential.

Chris Stockey That is a perfect note to end on—UNFC acting as a translation tool to bring stakeholders together and provide a future-looking perspective on shoring up our economies. A massive thank you to you, Vitor, for appearing on the podcast. What a way to kick off the series.

Vitor Correia Thank you so much for having me. It was a pleasure.

Matthew Grimshaw The views, thoughts, and opinions expressed by guests or contributors on the podcast are solely their own and do not necessarily reflect those of the hosts, Satarla, and Critical Productions. Any statements made should not be interpreted as endorsements or official positions. Listener discretion is advised.